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Abstract
I thank Lisa Barrett for the stimulating and comprehensive article explaining her theory of emotion. In what follows I will
summarize what I take to be our points of agreement, my confusions, and suggestions for how to move forward.
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Where we agree (I think)
I agree that our current criteria for categorizing emotions need
to be improved, and that words like ‘anger, fear’ etc. need revi-
sion. Constructed Emotion Theory seems to go further than
this, however, and at least at times advocates an apparent rad-
ical relativism (‘Emotion categories are as real as any other con-
ceptual categories that require a human perceiver for existence,
such as “money”’), with which I disagree (see below). However,
it may be that this relativism is intended only towards specific
emotion categories, not to dimensions of emotion and not to
emotion generically, which would bring us closer together.
Surely, we cannot choose to apply the term ‘emotion’ to
just anything, otherwise our own articles on emotion might
or might not be about emotion (or might be about emotion if
read in America, but about something else if read in Europe).
I think, then, that Lisa’s article is making a substantive and
important point about our need to have better criteria for
identifying a state as an emotion—but not proposing that we
don’t need criteria at all or can make up any; and with this I
agree.
I agree with the article’s discussions of neural reuse, predictive
coding and dynamic routing; all these are current theories about
brain function for which there is considerable support. I also agree
that the brain makes predictions even before birth, since there
must be innate priors of some sort (for what it’s worth, I think there
are innate emotions, but not innate concepts). So, although one
can quibble about details, I broadly agree with the gist of the art-
icle’s discussion about brain function.
I largely agree with the entries in Table 2 that seem to be a
key ingredient for the Theory of Constructed Emotion (but I
mostly don’t agree with the claims of Table 1, not necessarily
because the entries are incorrect, but because they seem far too
inconclusive), and I agree that any specific emotion (e.g. fear)
does not arise from the activity of a single set of neurons (a
view I frankly don’t even understand). Finally, I agree with the
facts described about patients with amygdala damage.
The section, ‘Taking a network perspective’, puts forth several
interesting hypotheses about the functions of resting-state net-
works. I agree that brain function depends on distributed networks,
and that the current set of networks from resting-state data likely
make important contributions to many cognitive functions, but I
don’t see this as requiring us to neglect more classical units of ana-
lysis such as specific neuroanatomical structures and the systems
in which they participate. I think Lisa would also agree with this:
so, there are a variety of choices available for how you want to
study the brain at the systems level: some might involve resting-
state networks, some specific neuroanatomical structures or neur-
onal populations with them, and none aremutually exclusive.
Where I am confused
I said earlier that I broadly agree with what Lisa’s article says
about brain function (predictive coding, neural reuse,
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degeneracy etc.). On the other hand these features are (i) not at
all specific to emotions and (ii) not exclusive (there appear to be
instances of predictive coding in the brain, but not everywhere;
many functions show degenerative mappings to neuroanat-
omy, but not all). But I was confused about the relevance of all
this, since nowhere in the article was I able to actually find any
criteria for what counts as an emotion.
I find many of the interesting claims in the article complex
to evaluate because I am unclear either about what the terms
mean, or about the reasoning (or both). Here are two quotes that
could be useful seed points for future discussion:
‘In emotion research, degeneracy means that instances of an emo-
tion (e.g. fear) are created by multiple spatiotemporal patterns in
varying populations of neurons. Therefore, it is unlikely that all in-
stances of an emotion category share a set of core features’. I agree
with the first sentence, but don’t understand how the second fol-
lows. This may be because I am unclear on what ‘core features’
means; the examples given in the article seem obviously wrong. In
my view, the ‘core features’ are functional features (along the lines
of the ones listed in Table 2 of my original article).
‘What is a brain for? A brain did not evolve for rationality, happi-
ness, or accurate perception. All brains accomplish the same core
task . . . to efficiently ensure resources. . . so that an animal can
grow, survive and reproduce’.
I think this conflates proximal and distal mechanisms (and I have
the same reaction when Joe LeDoux writes of ‘survival circuits’).
Yes, everything evolved, and some of that evolution is directed to-
wards adaptations for survival and reproduction. But the aggregate
long-term adaptive pressure towards survival and reproduction is
mediated by many constrained and more proximal mechanisms.
So I would disagree that emotions function ‘for survival’. They are
one piece, amongst many others, that, in part, in a whole organ-
ism, in a certain environment, generally aid survival. But their
proximal function hasmuchmore specific, andmore short-sighted
goals: specific functions, for example of the sort that evolutionary
psychology hypothesizes. We need to understand those specific
functions and map them onto specific emotions, not erase their
boundaries by saying they all help survival.
A section that was tough going for me was the one titled,
‘The computational architecture of the brain is a conceptual
system plus pattern generators’, because I don’t understand
Lisa’s concept of a concept. For instance, the claim that, ‘when
the internal model creates an emotion concept, the result is an
instance of emotion’, would run counter to my view. As I was at
pains to point out in my original article, emotion concepts are
not emotions. Although the term ‘concept’ traditionally refers
to the mental representations by which we think about some-
thing (i.e. semantic knowledge), Lisa’s usage appears to be
broader. If it means something like ‘all the neuronal activity
engaged in an emotion state’, then of course I would agree that
emotions are concepts in this sense—but I am unclear on what
such a redefinition of the term ‘concept’ would actually eluci-
date. I end up knowing exactly what I did before: as imple-
mented in the human brain, emotion states typically involve
predictions and degeneracy and perceptual processes and
motor processes and a whole lot more.
The way forward
I appreciate what I think the Theory of Constructed Emotion is
trying to achieve. If I understand it right, the big-picture
motivation is twofold: (i) to forge a more holistic, distributed,
dynamic view of how emotions are generated in the brain, and
(ii) to free us from traditional categories of thinking about emo-
tions (like the terms for basic emotions).
I am very sympathetic with (ii), but I have doubts that (i) is the
way to do it. I agree that traditional emotion categories need revi-
sion, or even elimination in some cases, and of course I agree
that phrenological ways of thinking about brain function as ‘in’
specific regions isn’t how the brain works. But I nonetheless
think that we DO need categories of emotions (and/or dimen-
sions), and we DO need to make distinctions between brain sys-
tems and their functions. I have the same concern about various
versions of enactive/situated cognition: the fact that many of the
traditional distinctions draw the wrong boundaries does not
mean we should get rid of distinctions and aim towards some
conglomerate holism. We should just aim to redraw the
boundaries. If anything, I think we need more distinctions and a
more fine-grained taxonomy, not fewer. But most importantly, I
disagree that one can begin ‘. . .. . .with the structure and function
of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of
emotions might be’. I think this is squarely impossible, because I
think you absolutely need to begin with observation of behavior
and derive your categories from there.
I worry about radical versions of relativism that see emotion
terms as social constructs like money. In my view, emotions are
perfectly objective in the following formal sense: the statement,
e.g. ‘Ralph is in a state of fear’, is true or false independently of
whether I believe it to be true or false. I could be wrong about
my own emotion state. Science requires objectivity, and if any-
body were free to use the word ‘fear’ as they chose, we could
not have a science of emotion.
In terms of how best to derive the emotion categories that a
science of emotion requires, I disagree that,
‘. . . it makes no sense to elevate categories for anger, sadness, fear,
disgust and happiness to a common ethological framework for
comparing humans with other animals, when there is ample evi-
dence from linguistics, anthropology and psychology that these
categories do not offer a robust, universal framework . . .. .’
I simply think we should take our definition of these emotion
categories from biology and ethology.
There are two domains I omitted in my original article that
Lisa’s article acknowledges and that indeed need much more
discussion. One is interoception, the second is social communi-
cation. It is with respect to the latter that I suspect the Theory of
Constructed Emotion may be particularly important, since it is
indeed true that emotional displays have been co-opted by, and
serve a rich and complex role, in social communication—which
is highly variable and flexible. It is here that affective neurosci-
ence would transition to social neuroscience and, as with all dis-
tinctions, I think this one too is an important one to keep
in mind.
The theme of our invited debate was to give our view on
how we think neuroscience should study emotion. For me, that
is in part a very practical question: what criteria and terms can
we agree upon, and what specific framework can we provide for
those wanting to do experiments in affective neuroscience.
Towards that end, I am grateful for this debate.
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